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A FRAMEWORK FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
REMAND IN IMMIGRATION LAW
COLLIN SCHUELERt
ABSTRACT
This Article breaks new ground at the intersection of administrative
law and immigration law. One of the more important questions in both
fields is whether a reviewing court should resolve a legal issue in the first
instance or remand that issue to the agency. This Article advances the
novel claim that courts should use the modem framework for judicial
review of agency statutory interpretations to inform their resolution of
this remand question. Then, using this framework, the Article identifies
when remand is and is not appropriate in immigration cases. This critical
analysis, which urges a departure from conventional academic wisdom,
has significant implications for the larger theoretical debate over formal-
ism and functionalism in administrative law.
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INTRODUCTION
Administrative law students and scholars have long wrestled with
the complex subject of judicial review of agency statutory interpreta-
tions.' This topic reached a turning point in 2001. At that time, the Su-
preme Court explained when an agency's interpretation of a statutory
provision is entitled to Chevron deference and when it is given Skidmore
deference.2 Since then, there is a step-by-step framework that reviewing
courts should use to determine how much deference to give to an agen-
*3
cy's statutory interpretation.
1. See, e.g., Michael P. Healy, Reconciling Chevron, Mead, and the Review of Agency Dis-
cretion: Source of Law and the Standards of Judicial Review, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 1 (2011)
("[T]here have been longstanding questions about the application of the standards for reviewing
administrative action."); Gary Lawson & Stephen Kam, Making Law Out of Nothing at All: The
Origins of the Chevron Doctrine, 65 ADMIN. L. REv. 1, 3 (2013) (acknowledging the "decades of
prodigious . . . scholarship on judicial review of agency legal interpretations"); John G. Osborn,
Legal Philosophy and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Interpretation, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
115, 118 (1999) (acknowledging "the great bulk of. . . scholarship relating to Chevron and judicial
review of agency statutory interpretation"); Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic Substitution
Effect: Textual Plausibility, Procedural Formality, and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Inter-
pretations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 528, 529 (2006) ("Administrative law scholarship is obsessed with
the appropriate scope of judicial review of agency decisions."); Peter L. Strauss, "Deference" is Too
Confusing-Let's Call Them "Chevron Space" and "Skidmore Weight," 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143,
1144 (2012) ("Administrative law scholars have leveled a forest of trees exploring the mysteries of
the Chevron approach contemporary judges take to reviewing law-related aspects of administrative
action.").
2. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234-35 (2001).
3. See Healy, supra note 1, at 33 (discussing the framework for judicial review of agency
legal interpretations and ultimately "present[ing] a step-by-step approach to the review of agency
applications of law"); Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skid-
180 [Vol. 92:1
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While courts have repeatedly applied this framework when review-
ing agency decisions, this Article argues that the framework also plays an
important, albeit unappreciated, secondary role in immigration law. Over
the past decade, the Supreme Court has decided a series of immigration
cases and, in doing so, articulated and applied what has become known
as the "ordinary remand rule."4 This Article analyzes the modem Court's
remand jurisprudence and uncovers a significant lesson: If a case turns
on the meaning of a statutory provision the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals (BIA) either has not yet interpreted or has interpreted erroneously,
the reviewing court should use the framework for judicial review to de-
cide whether to answer the interpretive question in the first instance or
remand the issue to the agency. To be sure, the Court has not explicitly
referred to the framework for judicial review when deciding whether to
remand an unsettled interpretive issue to the BIA. Nevertheless, a close
look at the Court's opinions-especially its most recent decision in Ne-
gusie v. Holder5 -shows that the framework helps us understand when
such a remand is appropriate.
After analyzing how the framework for judicial review plays a key
role in the remand context, this Article considers when a reviewing court
should and should not remand an unsettled interpretive issue to the BIA.
The Supreme Court has already identified one situation in which a re-
viewing court should ordinarily remand an unsettled interpretive issue to
the BIA: when, pursuant to the framework for judicial review, the court
determines that the relevant statutory provision is ambiguous and Con-
gress delegated power to the BIA to interpret that provision.6 In other
words, a remand is proper when the BIA's interpretation will be entitled
to Chevron deference on review.7 That said, the Court has not decided
whether a remand is proper outside this context.
This Article, therefore, picks up where the Supreme Court left off.
The Article examines whether a reviewing court should remand an unset-
tled interpretive issue to the BIA when the agency's interpretation will
not be entitled to Chevron deference on review-either because (1) the
relevant statutory provision is unambiguous or (2) the relevant statutory
provision is ambiguous, but Congress did not delegate power to the BIA
to interpret that provision. The goal of this exercise is to define the prop-
er balance of power between courts and the BIA when it comes to resolv-
ing outstanding statutory interpretation questions. Ultimately, the Article
argues that, if a reviewing court faces an unsettled interpretive issue and
more Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1246 (2007) (discussing "[t]he [d]eference [f]ramework"
and recognizing that, in light of Mead, "the current regime for judicial review of agency legal inter-
pretations includes both Chevron and Skidmore as separate standards of review").
4. See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 524 (2009); Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 185
(2006) (per curiam); INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 18 (2002) (per curiam).
5. 555 U.S. at 516-17.
6. See infra Part II.C.(discussing Negusie).
7. This, of course, is provided the BIA actually exercises its delegated power.
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it determines that the relevant statutory provision is ambiguous, the court
should remand the matter to the BIA whether or not Congress delegated
lawmaking power to the agency. In other words, a remand is proper if the
BIA's interpretation will be entitled to either Chevron or Skidmore defer-
ence on review. This conclusion has significant implications for the larg-
er theoretical debate over formalism and functionalism in administrative
law.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Since this Article argues that the
framework for judicial review of agency statutory interpretations plays a
critical role in the remand context, Part I takes a step back and articulates
the framework and its underlying principles. Part II then examines the
Supreme Court's line of immigration decisions regarding the ordinary
remand rule, highlighting the important but understated role that the
framework for judicial review plays in a court's remand decision. Part III
then goes beyond the Court's case law and, using the framework for ju-
dicial review, identifies the circumstances under which reviewing courts
should and should not remand unsettled interpretive issues to the BIA. In
light of this analysis, Part IV outlines the proper balance of power be-
tween courts and the BIA when it comes to resolving outstanding statuto-
ry interpretation questions. This outline shows that formalist justifica-
tions for administrative remands are overstated-indeed, functionalist
justifications alone may warrant a remand. In the end, this Article helps
define the modem relationship between courts and the BIA.
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY STATUTORY INTERPRETATIONS
This Article argues that the framework for judicial review of agency
statutory interpretations plays an important role in immigration law as
reviewing courts decide whether to remand unresolved interpretive issues
to the BIA. This Part lays a foundation for that discussion by briefly re-
viewing Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,8 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc.,9 and United States v. Mead Corp. 0-the
three landmark Supreme Court cases that "function collectively as parts
of [the] comprehensive framework for judicial review of administrative
interpretations."" After examining these cases, including the principles
underlying each decision, this Part articulates the resulting framework
courts should apply when reviewing agency statutory interpretations.12
8. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
9. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
10. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
11. Hickman & Krueger, supra note 3, at 1239.
12. See also Healy, supra note 1, at 33-50 (providing a clear "step-by-step approach to the
review of agency applications of law"); Hickman & Krueger, supra note 3, at 1239, 1246-50 (dis-
cussing "the analytical framework for judicial review of administrative interpretations" that now
applies in light of Skidmore, Chevron, and Mead).
182 [Vol. 92: 1
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A. The Seminal Cases
1. Skidmore v. Swift & Co.
The first case that is usually associated with judicial review of
agency statutory interpretations is Skidmore.'3 There, the interpretive
issue was whether employee waiting time constituted "working time"
under the overtime pay provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.1 4 The
Administrator of the relevant agency had "set forth his views of the ap-
plication of the Act under different circumstances in an interpretive bul-
letin and in informal rulings."' 5 The trial court, however, did not consider
the Administrator's views in resolving the case and held as a matter of
law that waiting time did not constitute working time. 16
Although the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial
court,1 7 the Supreme Court reversed.' 8 In a methodical decision, the
Court first noted that the statute was ambiguous because it did not clearly
bar waiting time from constituting working time. 19 The Court then said
that Congress did not delegate lawmaking power to the agency "to de-
termine in the first instance whether particular cases fall within or with-
out the Act."2 0 Rather, Congress "put this responsibility on the courts."2
Nevertheless, the Court recognized that Congress created the Adminis-
trator's position and that the Administrator had gained "considerable
experience in the problems of ascertaining working time in employments
involving periods of inactivity and a knowledge of the customs prevail-
ing in reference to their solution."22 Thus, the Court said:
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the
Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts
by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort
for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will
depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validi-
ty of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronounce-
ments, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lack-
ing power to control. 23
13. See Healy, supra note 1, at 4. This is true even though "[t]he case involved private litiga-
tion to enforce a federal statute, not the review of agency action as such." Strauss, supra note 1, at
1167.
14. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 136 (1944).
15. Id. at 138.
16. Id. at 136, 140.
17. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 136 F.2d 112, 113 (5th Cir. 1943), rev'd, 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
18. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
19. See id. at 136-37 (citing Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126 (1944)).
20. Id. at 137.
21. Id. (citing Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 523 (1942)).
22. Id. at 137-38.
23. Id. at 140.
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In the end, the Court remanded the case to the trial court so it could
properly consider the Administrator's views.24
Ultimately, Skidmore makes it clear that when a statute is ambigu-
ous and Congress has not delegated lawmaking power to an agency to
interpret the statute, "a court must decide how the statute applies to the
uncertain circumstance."2 5 Nevertheless, in making this determination,
the court may consider "the interpretation adopted by the agency that
administers the statute." 26 This is "not because the agency's interpreta-
tion is formally binding." 27 Instead, the court may consider the agency's
interpretation for functional reasons-that is, the agency's experience
and expertise "may be useful by providing 'guidance,' as the court itself
decides what the statute means when applying the statute in a particular
case." 28
2. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
For almost four decades, Skidmore represented the Supreme Court's
leading statement on judicial review of agency statutory interpretations.2 9
Then, in 1984, the Court issued its landmark opinion in Chevron, estab-
lishing a two-step approach for courts to use when reviewing agency
decisions. 30 The Court famously said:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute
which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, al-
ways, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the
end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give ef-
fect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however,
the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construc-
tion on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an admin-
istrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether
24. Id.
25. Healy, supra note 1, at 9 (discussing Skidmore).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140); see also Michael P. Healy, The Past, Present and
Future of Auer Deference: Mead, Form and Function in Judicial Review ofAgency Interpretations
of Regulations, 62 U. KAN. L. REv. 633, 691 (2014) ("Skidmore review retains functionalism, be-
cause it accounts for the agency's experience and expertise in its consideration of the agency's
reasons for its interpretation. The agency's reasons for the interpretation, if they are persuasive
because they are grounded in expertise and experience, may provide strong support for the interpre-
tation and would accordingly be persuasive to a court ..... (footnote omitted)).
29. See Hickman & Krueger, supra note 3, at 1236 ("For forty years, the Supreme Court's
opinion in Skidmore v. Swift & Co. enjoyed prominence as perhaps the Supreme Court's best expres-
sion of its policy of judicial deference toward many if not most agency interpretations of law."
(footnote omitted)); id. at 1239 ("[F]or forty years before Chevron was decided, the Supreme Court's
opinion in Skidmore v. Swilt & Co. was a leading expression of the Court's policy toward judicial
review of most other administrative interpretations." (footnote omitted)).
30. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
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the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.3 '
The Court then elaborated on these two steps and in doing so, "estab-
lished the foundations for the modern understanding of judicial review of
agency legal interpretations." 32
The Court explained that at step one the reviewing court must de-
cide whether Congress clearly resolved the relevant interpretive issue.33
The court makes this decision by "employing traditional tools of statuto-
ry construction," 34 including a consideration of the statute's text35 and
legislative history. 36 If the court "ascertains that Congress had an inten-
tion on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be
given effect."37 But if the court decides that Congress did not clearly
resolve the relevant interpretive issue, then the court must proceed to the
second step.
The Court explained that at step two a reviewing court must defer to
the agency's statutory interpretation.39 The Court articulated both formal-
ist and functionalist justifications for according deference to agencies. 0
Most significantly, the Court espoused the formalist view that Congress
implicitly delegates interpretive power to an agency when it adopts an
ambiguous statute.4 In other words, as the Court later put it, reviewing
courts should defer to agencies at step two "because of a presumption
that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for implementa-
tion by an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first
and foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency (rather than the
courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows." 4 2
31. Id (footnotes omitted).
32. Healy, supra note 1, at 15.
33. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9 (noting that "[t]he judiciary is the final authority on
issues of statutory construction").
34. Id
35. See id. at 859-62 (reviewing the text of the Clean Air Act).
36. See id. at 862-64 (examining the Clean Air Act's legislative history).
37. Id. at 843 n.9.
38. See id. at 843.
39. See id. at 843-44.
40. See id. at 843-44, 865-66.
41. Id. at 843-44 ("If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regu-
lation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious,
or manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particu-
lar question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own con-
struction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an
agency." (footnote omitted)).
42. Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1996) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S.
at 843-44); see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000) ("Def-
erence under Chevron to an agency's construction of a statute that it administers is premised on the
theory that a statute's ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to
fill in the statutory gaps.").
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Although the Court's decision to defer to the agency was based al-
most exclusively on its formalist notion that Congress implicitly delegat-
ed interpretive authority to the agency when it adopted an ambiguous
statute,43 the Court also briefly suggested that it should defer for a func-
tionalist reason: the agency had experience and expertise in resolving
issues within its sphere of authority." In short, as one scholar put it,
"[T]he Court suggested that Chevron deference is motivated by the same
motivations that animated Skidmore deference: agency experience and
,,45
expertise.
In the end, the Court said that when an agency is entitled to defer-
ence at step two, a reviewing court "may not substitute its own construc-
tion of a statutory provision."46 Rather, the court must decide if the agen-
cy's interpretation "is based on a permissible construction of the stat-
ute."47 This means the court must uphold the agency's interpretation of
the relevant statutory provision as long as it is reasonable. 4 8
Ultimately, Chevron is famous for its two-step approach to judicial
review of agency statutory interpretations.49 However, much attention
43. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
44. See id. at 865. Indeed, in saying that the agency's interpretation was "entitled to defer-
ence," the Court noted that "the regulatory scheme is technical and complex, the agency considered
the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and the decision involves reconciling conflicting
policies." Id. (footnotes omitted). The Court then said Congress may have intentionally wanted the
agency to interpret the relevant statutory provision, "thinking that those with great expertise and
charged with responsibility for administering the provision would be in a better position to do so."
Id.
45. Healy, supra note 1, at 17-18; see also Evan J. Criddle, Chevron's Consensus, 88 B.U. L.
REV. 1271, 1286-87 (2008) ("In Chevron, the ... Court marshaled ... expertise-based arguments in
support of flexible agency administration."); Robert Knowles, American Hegemony and the Foreign
Affairs Constitution, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 87, 100-01 (2009) (claiming that "[f]unctionalism lies at the
heart of Chevron" because the Court considered "functional, institutional competence justifications"
including "agency expertise"); Leading Cases, Preemption ofState Law Enforcement, 123 HARV. L.
REV. 322, 330 (2009) (arguing that "Chevron rests on . . . functional arguments," including the
notion "that agencies possess the necessary expertise to carry out congressional orders").
46. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844; see also id at 843 n. II ("The court need not conclude that the
agency construction was the only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction,
or even the reading the court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial
proceeding.").
47. Id. at 843.
48. See id at 844 (stating that, at the second step, a reviewing court must not disturb "a rea-
sonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency"); see also Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No.
89 v. Dep't of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 89 (2007) ("[I]f the language of the statute is open or ambigu-
ous-that is, if Congress left a 'gap' for the agency to fill-then we must uphold the Secretary's
interpretation as long as it is reasonable.") (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43).
49. See, e.g., RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, PAUL M. VERKUIL,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 7.4, at 399 (5th ed. 2009) ("The Court has applied the Chev-
ron two-step in over one hundred cases decided since 1984, and circuit courts have applied it in
thousands of cases."); Healy, supra note 1, at 15 ("The decision is most famous for defining the two-
step approach for reviewing agency legal determinations." (foomote omitted)); Hickman & Krueger,
supra note 3, at 1241 ("The Chevron decision is best known for articulating the Court's two-part test
for evaluating agency interpretations of law. . . ."); Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The
Making of an Accidental Landmark, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 398, 415 (Peter L. Strauss
ed. 2006) ("Chevron is most famous . . . [for] the 'two-step' approach to review questions of law ...
."); Niki R. Ford, Article, Easy on the MAYO Please: Why Judicial Deference Should Not Be Ex-
tended to Regulations that Violate the Administrative Procedure Act, 50 DUQ. L. REv. 799, 820
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has also been paid to the Court's formalist view that Congress implicitly
delegates interpretive power to an agency when it enacts an ambiguous
statute.o One pair of scholars has even argued that the "application of
compulsory judicial deference to so-called implicit delegations, more
than the two-part test, is what made Chevron revolutionary."5 ' Unfortu-
nately, as these scholars also point out, "Chevron did not make clear
when exactly courts should presume that Congress delegated interpretive
authority to the agency, or concomitantly, when Chevron's framework of
controlling deference was appropriate." 52 The Supreme Court attempted
to answer these questions seventeen years later in Mead," the third and
final case to help shape the modem framework for judicial review of
agency statutory interpretations.54
3. United States v. Mead Corp.
Mead determined when an agency's interpretation of a statutory
provision is entitled to Chevron deference and when it is given Skidmore
deference.55 In making this determination, the Court expressed the for-
malist view that Congress defines the amount of deference reviewing
courts owe to an agency's statutory interpretation. 56 With this in mind,
(2012) ("The upshot of Chevron is the famous two-part inquiry now ingrained in administrative law
50. See, e.g., Melissa M. Berry, Beyond Chevron's Domain: Agency Interpretations ofStatu-
tory Procedural Provisions, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 541, 563 (2007) ("Chevron broadened the scope
of mandatory deference from express delegations of interpretive authority to include instances of
'implied delegation' when Congress is silent or leaves language ambiguous in a statute that an agen-
cy is charged with administering. In Chevron, the Court announced that such statutory gaps and
ambiguities are implied delegations requiring deference." (footnote omitted)); Criddle, supra note
45, at 1284 ("Arguably the leading rationale for Chevron deference is the presumption that Congress
delegates interpretive authority to administrative agencies when it commits regulatory statutes to
agency administration."); Healy, supra note 1, at 16 ("The Court's motivation for granting deference
to agencies came from the Court's view that statutory ambiguity means that Congress has delegated
interpretive authority to agencies and not courts." (footnote omitted)).
51. Hickman & Krueger, supra note 3, at 1242; see also Kristen E. Hickman, The Need for
Mead: Refecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1548 (2006)
[hereinafter Hickman, Need for Mead] ("The more revolutionary . . . aspect of Chevron is its call for
strong, mandatory deference not only where Congress specifically mandates regulations, but also
where Congress implicitly delegates rulemaking authority through the combination of statutory
ambiguity and administrative responsibility.. . . This extension of strong judicial deference from
explicit to so-called implicit delegations represents a transfer of interpretive power from the judicial
branch to administrative agencies. This, more than the two-part test, is the heart of the Chevron
doctrine." (footnote omitted)); Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation
and Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 187, 203 (1992) ("If Chevron is a revolu-
tionary case, what makes it so is its apparent hospitality to implied delegations generally, and dele-
gations by ambiguity in particular.").
52. Hickman & Krueger, supra note 3, at 1242-43.
53. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-38 (2001).
54. See Healy, supra note 1, at 18 (recognizing that Mead assists in "defining the modem
approach to judicial review of agency legal and discretionary determinations").
55. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 234-35.
56. See id. ("We agree that a tariff classification has no claim to judicial deference under
Chevron, there being no indication that Congress intended such a ruling to carry the force of law, but
we hold that under Skidmore the ruling is eligible to claim respect according to its persuasiveness."
(citation omitted)); see also Healy, supra note 1, at 18 ("[T]he Court reiterated its consistent view
that Congress has the authority to define the degree of deference owed to an agency decision."); id.
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the Court held "that administrative implementation of a particular statu-
tory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Con-
gress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying
the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference
was promulgated in the exercise of that authority."57
The Court then elaborated on these elements, saying that a review-
ing court can generally assume Congress expects an agency to act with
the force of law when it permits the agency to engage in formal adjudica-
tions, notice-and-comment rulemaking, or where there is some other
indication that Congress intended to delegate lawmaking power to the
agency.58 The Court also recognized those agency determinations that
"are beyond the Chevron pale,"59 such as "interpretations contained in
policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines." 6 0 The
Court applied these principles to the facts of the case and decided that the
agency interpretation at issue should not be afforded Chevron defer-
ence.
Nevertheless, the Court held that the agency interpretation was enti-
tled to Skidmore deference.62 The Court explained that, as a functional
matter, "Chevron did nothing to eliminate Skidmore's holding that an
agency's interpretation may merit some deference whatever its form,
given the 'specialized experience and broader investigations and infor-
mation' available to the agency."63 Since the lower courts had not given
any deference to the relevant agency interpretation,6 the Court remanded
the case so that those courts could make a "Skidmore assessment." 6 5
In short, Mead was principally a formalist, separation-of-powers-
driven decision. 66 Indeed, the Court established that if Congress delegat-
ed lawmaking authority to the agency, and the agency interpreted the
at 21 ("Mead reinforced the principle that Congress determines the degree of deference courts owe
to agency legal interpretations.").
57. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27.
58. See id. at 227, 229-30.
59. Id. at 234.
60. See id (quoting Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
61. Id. at 231 ("There are ... ample reasons to deny Chevron deference here. The authoriza-
tion for classification rulings, and Customs's practice in making them, present a case far removed
not only from notice-and-comment process, but from any other circumstances reasonably suggesting
that Congress ever thought of classification rulings as deserving the deference claimed for them
here.").
62. See id at 234-35.
63. Id. at 234 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944)).
64. See id. at 225-26.
65. Id. at 238-39.
66. See, e.g., Mehmet K. Konar-Steenberg, In Re Annandale and the Disconnections Between
Minnesota and Federal Agency Deference Doctrine, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1375, 1395 (2008)
(arguing that Chevron and Mead are "about judicial respect for the intent of Congress-in a phrase,
separation of powers"); Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies,
120 YALE L.J. 1032, 1061-62 (2011) ("A conventional defense of [the Mead] holding ... is ground-
ed in ideas about the proper functioning of the branches of government.").
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relevant provision in an exercise of that authority, then the reviewing
court should give Chevron deference to the agency's interpretation.67 if,
however, Congress did not delegate lawmaking authority to the agency,
or the agency's interpretation was not made in an exercise of its delegat-
ed authority, then the reviewing court should independently interpret the
statutory provision.18 That said, in the latter situation, the reviewing court
should give Skidmore deference to the agency's interpretation because,
as a functional matter, the agency's interpretation may be rooted in its
experience and expertise. 69 In the end, since "[t]he Mead analysis deter-
mines whether the Chevron regime or the Skidmore regime applies to
review of [an] agency decision,"70 the analysis serves as the heart of what
scholars now call "the analytical framework for judicial review of admin-
istrative interpretations." 71
B. The Framework for Judicial Review
When reviewing an agency's statutory interpretation, a court should
first decide, pursuant to Chevron step one, "whether Congress has direct-
ly spoken to the precise question at issue." 72 The court makes this deci-
67. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27. In other words, as Professor Healy has explained:
Mead established . . . that there are two requirements for an agency to be seen as the
source of lawmaking power: Congress must have delegated lawmaking power to the
agency and the agency must actually have exercised that delegated lawmaking power.
The agency must have been able to make law and must have intended to make law.
Healy, supra note 1, at 40 (footnote omitted). He then recognized that, if these two requirements are
met, "the court accords Chevron step-two deference to the agency legal determination." Id. at 42.
68. See Healy, supra note 1, at 19-21. Professor Healy has said that, pursuant to Mead,
"[a]gency-defined law is not present if either the agency lacked the delegated authority to make
decisions with the force of law or the agency did not exercise its delegated lawmaking power." Id. at
19 (citing Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27). Professor Healy then pointed out that, in this situation, "the
court interprets the statute giving appropriate deference, under the circumstances, to the agency's
interpretation, but deciding for itself the meaning of the statute." Id. at 21; see also John W. Guen-
delsberger, Judicial Deference to Agency Decisions in Removal Proceedings in Light of INS v.
Ventura, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 605, 619 (2004) (stating that if Mead's two "requirements are not
met, Chevron deference is inapplicable, but Mead requires that the court, nonetheless, apply 'some
deference' to the agency's judgment as to the meaning of the law, according to its persuasiveness.")
(quoting Mead, 533 U.S. at 234, in turn citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944)).
69. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
70. Healy, supra note 1, at 42 n.265; see also Hickman & Krueger, supra note 3, at 1247
("Mead ... articulates its own two-part inquiry for discerning which of these two standards of re-
view applies in any given case .... ); Magill & Vermeule, supra note 66, at 1061-62 ("Mead estab-
lishes the conditions under which an agency will be eligible for Chevron deference. . . . [The case]
creates two regimes, one where Chevron does not apply and one where it does . . . ."); Thomas W.
Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, 54 ADMIN. L.
REV. 807, 812 (2002) ("Mead ... emphatically reaffirms that the choice is not between Chevron or
no deference. If Chevron does not apply, courts nevertheless may be required to defer to agency
interpretations under Skidmore, which applies when the agency has some special claim to expertise
under the statute, but its interpretation is not legally binding."); Christopher J. Walker, The Ordinary
Remand Rule and the Judicial Toolbox for Agency Dialogue, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1553, 1571
n.81 (2014) ("The Court's decision in United States v. Mead Corp. confirmed that Skidmore defer-
ence applies when Chevron does not." (citation omitted)).
71. Hickman & Krueger, supra note 3, at 1239.
72. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984); see
also Healy, supra note 1, at 33 (stating that a reviewing court should first "[d]etermin[e]
[wihether the [s]tatute [i]tself [c]learly [d]efines the [1]aw").
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sion by "employing traditional tools of statutory construction," 7 3 includ-
ing a consideration of the statute's text74 and legislative history. The
court should make this Chevron step-one determination up front because
"if Congress itself is the source of clear law that conflicts with the agen-
cy's interpretation, the law as defined by Congress governs and the con-
trary agency interpretation must be rejected." 76 Indeed, the Chevron
Court stated plainly: "If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of
the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."7 7 However, if the review-
ing court holds that "the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue,"78 then the court should use "the Mead analysis" to decide
how much deference to give to the agency's interpretation.79
Pursuant to Mead, the reviewing court must ask: (1) whether "Con-
gress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying
the force of law,"80 and (2) whether "the agency interpretation claiming
deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority."" This is
because these two questions "provide a threshold inquiry to determine
which of two potential evaluative standards, Chevron or Skidmore, ap-
plies to . . . [the] case." 82
If the court determines that Congress delegated lawmaking authori-
ty to the agency, and the agency interpreted the relevant statutory provi-
73. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
74. See id. at 859-62.
75. See id. at 862-64.
76. Healy, supra note 1, at 33; see also Hickman & Krueger, supra note 3, at 1247 ("[A]
reviewing court will not defer to an agency under either [Chevron or Skidmore] if the statute's mean-
ing is clear .... Thus, a court can engage in step one analysis before having to use Mead to make the
choice between Chevron and Skidmore.").
77. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43; see also id. at 843 n.9 ("If a court, employing traditional
tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at
issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.").
78. Id. at 843.
79. Healy, supra note 1, at 39 ("After the court has determined that the statute is ambiguous
regarding the legal issue resolved by the agency, the court must identify the review regime that
applies to the agency determination. This is the Mead analysis . . . ."); see also id at 39-42 (discuss-
ing "the Mead analysis" as the second step in his step-by-step framework for judicial review of
agency legal interpretations); Hickman, supra note 5 1, at 1600-01 ("Chevron and Skidmore are the
only two deference alternatives and . . . Mead offers the appropriate framework for choosing be-
tween them . . . ."); Hickman & Krueger, supra note 3, at 1247 (recognizing that reviewing courts
"use Meadto make the choice between Chevron and Skidmore").
80. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
81. Id. at 227; see also Merrill, supra note 70, at 813 ("The [Meadj Court held that a two part
inquiry should be undertaken in determining whether Chevron-style deference is in order. The court
should ask, first, whether Congress has delegated to an agency general authority to make rules with
the 'force of law.' If the answer is in the affirmative, the court should then ask whether the agency
has rendered its interpretation in the 'exercise of that authority."' (footnotes omitted) (quoting Mead,
533 U.S. at 227)).
82. Hickman & Krueger, supra note 3, at 1247; see also Garrick B. Pursley, Avoiding Defer-
ence Questions, 44 TULSA L. REV. 557, 575 n. 141 (2009) ("[U]nder Mead, the threshold question in
the deference inquiry-the decision to apply Chevron or reject it in favor of Skidmore or independ-
ent judicial interpretation-requires determining where Congress intended to vest primary interpre-
tive authority.").
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sion in an exercise of that authority, then the reviewing court should give
Chevron deference to the agency's interpretation.83 There are multiple
justifications for granting Chevron deference to an agency under these
circumstances, including the formalist view that Congress intended the
agency to receive such deference, as well as the functionalist notion that
an agency has experience and expertise in resolving issues within its
sphere of authority.84 In the end, according Chevron deference to the
agency means that the court "must uphold the [agency's] interpretation
as long as it is reasonable."85
On the other hand, if the reviewing court conducts the Mead analy-
sis and determines that Congress did not delegate lawmaking authority to
the agency, or the agency's interpretation was not made in an exercise of
its delegated authority, then the court should independently interpret the
statutory provision.86 This is because, in a formal sense, Congress did not
intend the agency to receive Chevron deference. Nevertheless, the re-
viewing court should give Skidmore deference to the agency's interpreta-
tion because, as a functional matter, the agency's interpretation may be
rooted in its experience and expertise. Ultimately, according Skidmore
deference to the agency means the court "follows the agency interpreta-
tion only to the extent the court is persuaded by the agency's interpreta-
tion."8
83. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27.
84. See supra notes 44, 66-67 and accompanying text.
85. Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 89 (2007) (citing Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43); see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at
844 (stating that, at this second step, a reviewing court must not disturb "a reasonable interpretation
made by the administrator of an agency").
Professor Healy has recognized that "accord[ing] Chevron step-two deference to the agency
legal determination" is akin to "engag[ing] solely in arbitrary or capricious review of the agency
determination." Healy, supra note 1, at 42. He explains that:
Step I of the analysis has already determined that the statute is ambiguous with respect
to the agency's substantive legal decision. This decision is equivalent to holding that the
agency has discretion under the statute to reach its substantive decision (because it is not
barred by the statute). Moreover, step 2 of the analysis has, we have assumed, yielded a
conclusion that the agency has been delegated by Congress and has exercised lawmaking
authority with regard to the determination being challenged. The remaining issue relating
to the legality of the agency position is, therefore, whether the agency has properly exer-
cised its discretion: the proper exercise of discretion is the subject of arbitrary or capri-
cious review.
Id. at 43. The Supreme Court and other scholars have echoed this point. See, e.g., Judulang v. Hold-
er, 132 S. Ct. 476, 483 n.7 (2011) ("[U]nder Chevron step two, we ask whether an agency interpreta-
tion is 'arbitrary or capricious in substance."' (quoting Mayo Found, for Med. Educ. & Research v.
United States, 131 S. Ct, 704, 711 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted); James M. Puckett,
Embracing the Queen of Hearts. Deference to Retroactive Tax Rules, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 349,
362 (2013) ("When Chevron deference applies, the court's review virtually collapses into arbitrary
and capricious review.").
86. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text (implicitly making this point).
88. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
89. Healy, supra note 1, at 2 n.5 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)). With
this in mind, multiple scholars have argued that "Skidmore deference" is not really deference at all.
See, e.g., William D. Araiza, Deference to Congressional Fact-Finding in Rights-Enforcing and
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II. UNCOVERING THE FRAMEWORK'S SECONDARY ROLE
In light of Mead, lower courts have applied the framework for judi-
cial review of agency statutory interpretations when reviewing agency
decisions. 90 Although the framework exists to help reviewing courts de-
termine how much deference to give to an agency's statutory interpreta-
tion, this Part argues that the framework also plays an important, albeit
unappreciated, secondary role in immigration law.
Since issuing its opinion in Mead, the Supreme Court has decided a
series of immigration cases and, in doing so, articulated and applied what
has become known as the "ordinary remand rule." This Part analyzes the
three decisions in this series-INS v. Ventura,91 Gonzales v. Thomas,92
and Negusie v. Holder-and uncovers a significant lesson: If a case turns
on the meaning of a statutory provision the BIA either has not yet inter-
preted or has interpreted erroneously, the reviewing court should use the
framework for judicial review to decide whether to answer the interpre-
tive question in the first instance or remand the issue to the agency. It is
true that the Court has not explicitly referred to the framework for judi-
cial review when deciding whether to remand an unsettled interpretive
issue to the BIA. Nevertheless, a close examination of the Court's opin-
ions, particularly its most recent decision in Negusie, shows that the
framework helps us understand when such a remand is appropriate.
A. INS v. Ventura: Hinting at the Framework's Relevance in the Remand
Context
The modem Supreme Court first articulated immigration law's or-
dinary remand rule in INS v. Ventura, a decision issued less than eighteen
months after Mead.93 In Ventura, the BIA had determined that Fredy
Rights-Limiting Legislation, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 878, 890 (2013) (observing that Skidmore deference
"really isn't 'deference' at all"); Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of
Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1467 n.155 (2005) ("[T]he phrase Skidmore 'deference' is
misleading. A court granting Skidmore deference does not actually relinquish interpretive power to
the agency but recognizes the agency as a kind of expert witness, particularly useful in rendering its
own interpretive judgment."); Healy, supra note 1, at 46 n.281 ("The text employs the common
expression of Skidmore deference, even though that expression is a misnomer. A more accurate
expression would be Skidmore guidance or Skidmore persuasion."); Gregg D. Polsky, Can Treasury
Overrule the Supreme Court?, 84 B.U. L. REV. 185, 198 n.80 (2004) ("Courts have commonly used
the phrase 'Skidmore deference' to refer to the amount of respect accorded agency interpretations
under Skidmore. This phrase, however, is an oxymoron.. .. [T]he court never technically defers to
the agency position under Skidmore even if the court ultimately adopts the position; the agency
position is mere evidence considered by the court in its attempt to determine the single best interpre-
tation." (citation omitted)); Strauss, supra note 1, at 1145 (arguing that the more appropriate phrase
would be "Skidmore weight" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
90. See, e.g., De Leon-Ochoa v. Attorney Gen., 622 F.3d 341, 348-49 (3d Cir. 2010).
91. 537 U.S. 12 (2002) (per curiam).
92. 547 U.S. 183, 185 (2006) (per curiam).
93. That said, some scholars have argued that the ordinary remand rule can actually be traced
to the Supreme Court's early decision in SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery 1), 318 U.S. 80 (1943),
which was cited in each of the modern Court's decisions. See Walker, supra note 70, at 1561-79
("trac[ing] the remand rule from its Chenery origins through the trilogy of Supreme Court immigra-
tion adjudication cases in the 2000s that further refined the rule"); Patrick J. Glen, "To Remand or
192 [Vol. 92:1
2014] JUDICIAL REVIEW, REMAND INIMMIGRATIONLAW 193
Orlando Ventura, a native and citizen of Guatemala, did not qualify for
asylum because any past persecution he suffered in Guatemala was not
"on account of a statutorily protected ground." 94
The Ninth Circuit reversed the BIA's decision, as it held that Ventu-
ra had, in fact, suffered "past persecution on account of [an] imputed
political opinion." But instead of remanding the case to the BIA at that
point, the court "went on to consider an alternative argument that the
Government had made before the [agency], namely, that . . . Ventura
failed to qualify for protection regardless of past persecution because
conditions in Guatemala had improved to the point where no realistic
threat of persecution currently existed."96 Although the BIA had not re-
solved this so-called "changed circumstances" matter,9 7 and both parties
asked the court to let the agency decide that issue in the first instance,9 8
the Ninth Circuit evaluated the Government's argument and rejected it.99
The Government then petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari,
arguing the Ninth Circuit erred by resolving the changed circumstances
issue on its own rather than remanding that question to the BIA.1c" The
Court agreed and summarily reversed the Ninth Circuit. 101
The Court began its discussion with a formalist, Mead-like analy-
siS.102 Indeed, the Court quickly mentioned that Congress delegated pow-
Not to Remand": Ventura 's Ordinary Remand Rule and the Evolving Jurisprudence of Futility, 10
RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & Bus. 1, 3 (2010) ("This general rule pertaining to remand was enunciated in
the administrative context in the Chenery decision, and given specific weight in the immigration
context by the Supreme Court's 2002 decision in INS v. Ventura.").
94. Ventura v. INS, 264 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd per curiam, 537 U.S. 12
(2002). According to the Immigration and Nationality Act, an applicant for asylum must "establish
that the applicant is a refugee, within the meaning of section I l01(a)(42)(A)." Immigration and
Nationality Act § 208(b)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § I158(b)(1)(B) (2012). A refugee is then defined as some-
one who can establish, among other things, "persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution [in his
home country] on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion." Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42).
95. See Ventura, 264 F.3d at 1157.
96. Ventura, 537 U.S. at 13 (emphasis added). Under the law, an asylum "applicant who has
been found to have established . . . past persecution shall also be presumed to have a well-founded
fear of persecution on the basis of the original [asylum] claim." 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2013).
However, the Government may rebut that presumption if it establishes, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that "[tlhere has been a fundamental change in circumstances such that the applicant no
longer has a well-founded fear of persecution in the applicant's country of nationality." 8 C.F.R. §
208.13(b)(1)(i) (2013).
97. See Ventura, 537 U.S. at 13 ("[T]he BIA itself had not considered this ... claim."); id. at
15 ("[T]he BIA had not decided the 'changed circumstances' question . . . .").
98. See id at 13 ("[B]oth sides asked that the Ninth Circuit remand the case to the BIA so that
it might [consider the changed circumstances issue].").
99. See id at 13-14. The Ninth Circuit held that the evidence in the record-particularly a
State Department report regarding human rights in Guatemala-failed to demonstrate a sufficient
change in circumstances. Therefore, the court concluded that Ventura was eligible for asylum. See
id. at 14-15.
100. See id. at 14 ("The Government, seeking certiorari here, argues that the Court of Appeals
exceeded its legal authority when it decided the 'changed circumstances' matter on its own.").
101. See id. ("We agree with the Government that the Court of Appeals should have remanded
the case to the BIA. And we summarily reverse its decision not to do so.").
102. See id at 16.
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er to "the agency to make the basic asylum eligibility decision here in
question."oM The Court then said that the BIA had not yet had the chance
to exercise its delegated power with respect to the changed circumstances
issue.'0 The Court said that under these circumstances the Ninth Circuit
should not have "intrude[d] upon the domain which Congress has exclu-
sively entrusted to an administrative agency."'05 Rather, it "should have
applied the ordinary 'remand' rule"106 which, according to the Court,
provides that, "[g]enerally speaking, a court of appeals should remand a
case to an agency for decision of a matter that statutes place primarily in
agency hands." 0 7 Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment of the
Ninth Circuit and remanded the case so that the BIA could resolve the
changed circumstances issue in the first instance. 08
In sum, Ventura was the first case in which the modem Court ar-
ticulated and applied the ordinary remand rule.1 09 The case ultimately
stands for the proposition that a reviewing court must ordinarily remand
an unresolved and dispositive question to the agency when the agency
has the delegated power to decide the issue.''o Multiple scholars have
recognized this as Ventura's holding."' What has gone unrecognized,
however, is that the Court reached its remand decision by pulling from
the heart of the framework for judicial review and conducting a Mead-
like analysis.1 2 To be sure, the Court never cited Mead. However, the
Court certainly echoed Mead's formalist language when it emphasized
that Congress had delegated authority to the BIA to resolve the changed
circumstances issue, but the agency had not yet had the opportunity to
exercise its delegated power.11 3 While no literature has yet alluded to a
relationship between Ventura and Mead, one prominent scholar has
acknowledged that the Ventura Court based its decision mostly on for-
malist separation-of-powers principles,1 4 especially "congressional
103. Id.; see also Glen, supra note 93, at 15 ("The Supreme Court noted that the Immigration
and Nationality Act entrusts to the agency the decision of whether or not an alien is eligible for
asylum, and thus the agency has primacy in resolving that issue." (citing Ventura, 537 U.S. at 16)).
104. See Ventura, 537 U.S. at 17 ("The BIA has not yet considered the 'changed circumstanc-
es' issue.").
105. Id. at 16 (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery 1), 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943)) (internal
quotation mark omitted). Similarly, the Court also quoted Chenery I by saying that "a 'judicial
judgment cannot be made to do service for an administrative judgment."' Id (quoting Chenery 1, 318
U.S. at 88).
106. Id at 18.
107. Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
108. See id. at 18 ("We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
insofar as it denies remand to the agency. And we remand the case for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.").
109. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
110. See Ventura, 537 U.S. at 16-17.
111. See Glen, supra note 93, at 19; Guendelsberger, supra note 68, at 636.
112. See Ventura, 537 U.S. at 16.
113. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
114. See Walker, supra note 70, at 1576 (noting that the Ventura Court articulated principles
that were "grounded in separation of powers"). That said, the Ventura Court also supported its deci-
sion with functionalist principles. See Ventura, 537 U.S. at 17. For example, the Court noted that
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delegation to the agency to decide the issues, and the lack of con-
gressional delegation or other source of authority for the judicial
actor to decide the issue de novo." 5 These same principles, of course,
are at the core of the Mead decision.116
After Ventura, it remained to be seen how the Court would apply
the ordinary remand rule. Indeed, the case left "considerable room for
disagreement as to when remand for further agency review is re-
quired."'"7  While some commentators viewed Ventura as a rather lim-
ited decision," others saw the case as having much broader implica-
tions.1 9 For example, shortly after the Ventura decision, Ninth Circuit
Judge Alex Kozinski wrote:
While the Court was careful to limit its ruling to the facts presented,
its message to us was clear to anyone with eyes to see: Stop substitut-
ing your judgment for that of the BIA; give proper deference to ad-
ministrative factfinding; and do not adopt rules of law that take away
the agency's ability to do its job. In other words, stop fiddling with
the agency's decisions just because you don't like the result.
We could, of course, read . . . Ventura . . . as limited to the ques-
tion[] presented in [that] case[]. But this would be a big mis-
take.... The Court . . . gave us a gentle hint that we must revise our
mindset on the key question about who's the master when it comes to
immigration cases. We must come to understand and accept . . . that
"within broad limits the law entrusts the agency to make the basic
asylum eligibility decision." 20
remanding the changed circumstances issue to the BIA would allow the agency to "bring its exper-
tise to bear upon the matter . .. and . . . help a court later determine whether its decision exceeds the
leeway that the law provides." Id.
115. Walker, supra note 70, at 1576. After noting that these "are two distinct Article I separa-
tion of powers values," Professor Walker astutely recognized that "[lt]hese become Article II values
as well, as they intrude on the Executive's responsibility to execute the law." Id.
116. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text (discussing Mead).
I17. Guendelsberger, supra note 68, at 644.
118. See Shruti Rana, Chevron Without the Courts?: The Supreme Court's Recent Chevron
Jurisprudence through an Immigration Lens, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 313, 350 (2012) ("[S]ome com-
mentators assumed that the Court was merely saying that courts should send back to the agency
unresolved factual issues.").
119. See id. at 349-50 (noting that "Ventura is a brief, rather simple decision with broad impli-
cations," before arguing that the Court "significantly tilt[ed] deference toward the agency").
120. Jahed v. INS, 356 F.3d 991, 1007-08 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added) (quoting Ventura v. INS, 537 U.S. 12, 17 (2002) (per curiam)). Similarly, in another dissent-
ing opinion issued soon after the Ventura decision, Ninth Circuit Judge Stephen Trott wrote:
Congress has charged the Attorney General, not us, with the primary responsibility for
administering the immigration laws. Our assigned limited role is to review the workings
of the BIA, not to run the INS. When we exceed our authority, separation and allocation
of powers in a constitutional sense are clearly implicated. "In this government of separat-
ed powers, it is not for the judiciary to usurp Congress' grant of authority to the Attorney
General by applying what approximates de novo appellate review."
Ramirez-Alejandre v. Ashcroft, 319 F.3d 365, 397 (9th Cir. 2003) (Trott, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted) (quoting INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444,452 (1985)).
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Ultimately, Judge Kozinski's broad, formalist view of Ventura prevailed
as the Supreme Court kept applying the ordinary remand rule.12 1 Notably,
in doing so, the Court continued to echo the framework for judicial re-
view of agency statutory interpretations.
B. Gonzales v. Thomas: Continuing to Echo the Framework in the Re-
mand Context
Less than four years after Ventura, the Supreme Court reapplied the
ordinary remand rule in Gonzales v. Thomas.122 There, the BIA had de-
termined that Michelle Thomas and her family, natives and citizens of
South Africa, did not qualify for asylum because any past persecution
they suffered in South Africa was not on account of the statutorily pro-
tected grounds of either race or political opinion.123
The Thomases appealed their case to the Ninth Circuit,1 24 and the
court quickly recognized "that the BIA had not adequately considered the
Thomases' claim of persecution because of 'membership in a particular
social group, as relatives of Boss Ronnie,"'l 25 Michelle's father-in-law
"who allegedly held racist views and mistreated black workers at the
company at which he was a foreman." 26 While the BIA had not reached
the particular social group issue, the Ninth Circuit eventually took the
case en banc and held, in the first instance, that "a family may constitute
a social group for the purposes of the refugee statutes," 27 and "that the
particular family at issue . .. fell within the scope of the statutory term
'particular social group.",1
28
The Government again petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari,
arguing that the Ninth Circuit "'erred in holding, in the first instance and
without prior resolution of the questions by the' relevant administrative
agency, 'that members of a family can and do constitute a "particular
social group," within the meaning of' the [Immigration and Nationality]
Act." 29 The Court agreed and, once more, summarily reversed the Ninth
Circuit.' 30
121. See Rana, supra note 118, at 349-53 (tracing the Court's evolving remand jurisprudence);
Walker, supra note 70, at 1575 (discussing "the evolution of the remand rule"); see also Glen, supra
note 93, at 13-19.
122. 547 U.S. 183, 185 (2006) (per curiam).
123. See id. at 184; see also supra note 94 (regarding the applicable law on asylum).
124. See Thomas v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2004), affd on reh'g sub nom.
Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc), vacated, 547 U.S. 183 (2006) (per
curiam).
125. Thomas, 547 U.S. at 184 (quoting Thomas, 359 F.3d at 1177).
126. Id.
127. Thomas, 409 F.3d at 1187.
128. Thomas, 547 U.S. at 184-85.
129. Id. at 185 (quoting the Solicitor General's petition for certiorari).
130. See id. ("[The Solicitor General] concludes that 'the Ninth Circuit's error is so obvious in
light of Ventura that summary reversal would be appropriate.' We agree with the Solicitor General."
(citation omitted)).
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The Court began by saying that "[t]he Ninth Circuit's failure to re-
mand is legally erroneous, and that error is 'obvious in light of Ventura,'
itself a summary reversal.""'3 The Court then quoted heavily from Ventu-
ra, especially those portions in which it had conducted the Mead-like
analysis.' 32 Indeed, the Court repeated its formalist statement that Con-
gress delegated power to "the agency to make the basic asylum eligibility
decision."' 3 3 The Court then said that the BIA had not yet had the chance
to exercise its delegated power with respect to the particular social group
issue.134 Therefore, the Court concluded that, "as in Ventura, the Court of
Appeals should have applied the 'ordinary "remand" rule.""35 Thus, the
Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case
so the BIA could resolve the particular social group issue in the first in-
stance. 3 6
In sum, Thomas reaffirmed the principle that a reviewing court must
ordinarily remand an unresolved and dispositive question to the agency
when the agency has the delegated power to decide the issue.1 37 This
much is clear from the Court's opinion. What has once again gone
unrecognized, however, is that the Court reached its remand decision by
conducting an analysis very similar to that required by the framework for
judicial review. Indeed, in Mead-like fashion, the Court emphasized that
Congress had delegated authority to the BIA to resolve the particular
social group issue, but the agency had not yet had the opportunity to ex-
ercise its delegated power.' 39
Thomas therefore reinforced the notion that when a reviewing court
is confronted with a dispositive issue the BIA has not yet had an oppor-
tunity to consider, the court should draw on the framework for judicial
review and conduct a Mead-like inquiry to determine whether Congress
delegated authority to the BIA to answer the relevant question. If Con-
gress did delegate such power to the BIA, then Ventura and Thomas both
indicate that the reviewing court should generally remand the unresolved
issue to the agency for a decision in the first instance.1 40 This is because
the ordinary remand rule provides that, "[g]enerally speaking, a court of
131. Id.
132. See id at 185-86.
133. Id. at 186 (quoting INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (per curiam)) (internal quota-
tion mark omitted).
134. See id. ("The agency has not yet considered whether Boss Ronnie's family presents the
kind of 'kinship ties' that constitute a 'particular social group."').
135. Id. at 187 (quoting Ventura, 537 U.S. at 18).
136. See id. ("We grant the petition for certiorari. We vacate the judgment of the Court of
Appeals. And we remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.").
137. See id. at 185-87.
138. See Glen, supra note 93, at 17 (discussing the Thomas decision).
139. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 133-136 and accompanying text.
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appeals should remand a case to an agency for a decision of a matter that
statutes place primarily in agency hands."41
After Thomas, it remained to be seen whether the Court would con-
tinue to echo, or even rely specifically upon, the framework for judicial
review in the remand context. The answer to this question came a few
years later when the Court directly confronted an unsettled statutory in-
terpretation issue.
C. Negusie v. Holder: The Framework Prompts the Court to Remand an
Outstanding Statutory Interpretation Question
The Supreme Court issued its most recent decision on the ordinary
remand rule in Negusie v. Holder. That case centered on a disagreement
over how to interpret the Immigration and Nationality Act's (INA's) so-
called "persecutor bar," 42 which provides that "[a]n alien who fears per-
secution in his homeland and seeks refugee status in this country is
barred from obtaining that relief if he has persecuted others."43 The key
statutory interpretation question in the case was whether "the persecutor
bar applies even if the alien's assistance in persecution was coerced or
otherwise the product of duress."l44
The BIA answered this question in the affirmative.14 5 The BIA's in-
terpretation, however, was based on its conclusion that the Supreme
Court had already resolved this issue in a previous decision.1 4 6 Similarly,
the Fifth Circuit relied on the same Supreme Court precedent to provide
the answer to the interpretive question.1 47
148
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and held that both the BIA
and the Fifth Circuit had misread its precedent "as mandating that an
alien's motivation and intent are irrelevant to the issue whether an alien
141. INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (per curiam) (emphasis added).
142. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 514 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
143. Id. at 513 (emphasis added); see also Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42), 8
U.S.C. § I 101(a)(42) (2012) ("The term 'refugee' does not include any person who ordered, incited,
assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.").
144. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 514.
145. See id. In other words, the BIA had determined that "an alien's motivation and intent are
irrelevant to the issue of whether he 'assisted' in persecution . . . [I]t is the objective effect of an
alien's actions which is controlling." Id. at 516 (alteration in original) (quoting Fedorenko, 19 1. &
N. Dec. 57 (B.I.A. 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
146. See id. at 514 ("[T]he BIA followed its earlier decisions that found Fedorenko v. United
States controlling." (citation omitted)); see also id at 521 ("The BIA deemed its interpretation to be
mandated by Fedorenko .... .").
147. Id. at 514 ("The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in affirming the agency, relied on
its precedent following the same reasoning."); see also id at 516 ("[T]he Court of Appeals agreed
with the BIA that whether an alien is compelled to assist in persecution is immaterial for persecutor-
bar purposes." (citing Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 512 n.34 (1981)); id. at 518 (recog-
nizing that the Fifth Circuit "relie[d] on Fedorenko to provide the answer").
148. Negusie v. Mukasey, 552 U.S. 1255 (2008) (granting certiorari), rev'd sub nom. Negusie
v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009).
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assisted in persecution."1 49 The Court explained that, in fact, its prece-
dent "addressed a different statute enacted for a different purpose."so
Therefore, the Court concluded that its prior decision did "not control the
BIA's interpretation of this persecutor bar." 51
Having determined that the BIA's interpretation of the persecutor
bar was erroneous,1 52 the Court had to decide whether to resolve the in-
terpretive issue on its own or remand the matter to the agency for a deci-
sion in the first instance.1 53 Ultimately, as in Ventura and Thomas, the
framework for judicial review allows us to understand the Court's deter-
mination.
This Article does not mean to suggest that the Court proceeded in a
perfectly systematic manner, deciding first that the BIA botched its in-
terpretation of the persecutor bar and then analyzing the step-by-step
framework for judicial review in order to answer the remand question.
To be sure, the Court's analysis was more elastic, moving back and forth
between a discussion of the BIA's erroneous statutory interpretation and
the relevant judicial review cases, particularly Chevron.' 54 That said, this
Article argues that once the Court determined that the BIA's statutory
interpretation was flawed, the framework for judicial review essentially
led the Court to remand the interpretive issue to the agency.
Indeed, in true framework-for-judicial-review fashion, the Court
considered whether the persecutor bar was ambiguous.15 5 The Court rec-
ognized that "[t]he question is whether the statutory text mandates that
coerced actions must be deemed assistance in persecution." 56 On that
point, the Court said, "[T]he statute, in its precise terms, is not explic-
it." 5 7 The Court then added that Congress did not clearly have "an inten-
tion on the precise question at issue." 58 The Court also noted that there
was "substance to both [parties'] contentions" as to the meaning of the
statute. 5 9 In short, the Court concluded that the statute was ambiguous
149. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 516.
150. Id. at 520; see also id. at 518-20 (discussing the differences between the Immigration and
Nationality Act, at issue in this case, and the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, at issue in Fedorenko).
151. Id. at 520.
152. See id. at 514, 521 (characterizing the BIA's statutory interpretation as an "error"); see
also Rana, supra note 118, at 352 ("[T]he majority of the [Negusie] Court decided that the immigra-
tion agency and the Fifth Circuit had legally erred by misapplying agency and Supreme Court prece-
dent on a similar issue to resolve the statutory interpretation issues at hand.").
153. See Negusie, 555 U.S. at 523.
154. See id. at 516-24; see also Healy, supra note 1, at 27 ("[T]he Court exhibited a great deal
of uncertainty in its approach."); id. (arguing that the Court's decision "reflected uncertainty regard-
ing the order and content of the analysis determining the applicability of Chevron deference").
155. See Negusie, 555 U.S. at 517-18.
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with respect to "whether coercion or duress is relevant in determining if
an alien assisted or otherwise participated in persecution."l 6 0
Moreover, while the Court never cited Mead,161 it once again con-
ducted a formalist, Mead-like analysis.1 62 Indeed, the Court said that
Congress delegated power to the Attorney General to administer the
INA,1 6 3 and "[t]he Attorney General, in turn, has delegated to the BIA
the 'discretion and authority conferred upon the Attorney General by
law' in the course of 'considering and determining cases before it.""6
Accordingly, the Court recognized that had the BIA interpreted the am-
biguous statute in an exercise of its delegated lawmaking authority, its
interpretation would have been given Chevron deference.1 65 But the
Court stressed that the BIA had not exercised its interpretive authority
because it mistakenly assumed that precedent controlled its interpreta-
S166tion.
160. Id. Justice Thomas dissented, writing that "the INA unambiguously precludes any inquiry
into whether the persecutor acted voluntarily, i.e., free from coercion or duress." Id. at 539 (Thomas,
J., dissenting). Justice Thomas argued that the majority made "no attempt to apply the 'traditional
tools of statutory construction' to the persecutor bar before retreating to ambiguity." Id. at 550.
Justice Thomas claimed that, in fact, "the traditional tools of statutory interpretation show with
'utmost clarity' that the statute applies regardless of the voluntariness of the alien who participates or
assists in persecution." Id at 551 (citation omitted).
161. See Healy, supra note 1, at 27 (recognizing that the Negusie Court proceeded "without
any citation to the Mead analysis").
162. See Negusie, 555 U.S. at 516-17 (majority opinion).
163. See id. at 516-17 ("Congress has charged the Attorney General with administering the
INA, and a 'ruling by the Attorney General with respect to all questions of law shall be control-
ling."' (quoting Immigration and Nationality Act § 103(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § I103(a)(1) (2012)); see
also Guendelsberger, supra note 68, at 620 ("Congress has expressly delegated to the Attorney
General the authority to administer and enforce the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality
Act.").
164. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 517 (internal quotation marks omitted); Guendelsberger, supra note
68, at 620 ("Although the [BIA] is not created by Congress, the Board exercises authority to inter-
pret the immigration laws on behalf of the Attorney General through a formal adjudicative pro-
cess.").
165. See Negusie, 555 U.S. at 516 ("Consistent with the rule in Chevron, the BIA is entitled to
deference in interpreting ambiguous provisions of the INA." (citation omitted)); see also id. at 517
("[T]he BIA should be accorded Chevron deference as it gives ambiguous statutory terms 'concrete
meaning through a process of case-by-case adjudication."' (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Other courts and scholars have made the same point. See, e.g., Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558
F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2009) ("The Board's interpretations of the INA made in the course of adjudi-
cating cases before it satisfy the first requirement for Chevron deference set forth in Mead: the
Board, through the Attorney General's delegation, is authorized to promulgate rules carrying the
force of law through a process of case-by-case adjudication and, thus, 'should be accorded Chevron
deference' as it exercises such authority to 'give[] ambiguous statutory terms "concrete meaning.""'
(alteration in original) (quoting INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999)); Omagah v.
Ashcroft, 288 F.3d 254, 258 n.3 (5th Cir. 2002) ("Because the BIA interpreted the INA through
formal adjudication, we give its interpretation Chevron deference." (citing United States v. Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001)); Guendelsberger, supra note 68, at 620 ("Under Mead, the
Board's interpretation of the immigration law through formal adjudication is generally subject to
Chevron deference.").
166. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 521 ("The BIA deemed its interpretation to be mandated by Fe-
dorenko, and that error prevented it from a full consideration of the statutory question here present-
ed."); id at 522 ("[T]he BIA has not exercised its interpretive authority but, instead, has determined
that Fedorenko controls. This [is a] mistaken assumption .... ); id. at 523 ("[T]he BIA has not yet
exercised its Chevron discretion to interpret the statute in question .... ).
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Therefore, the Court ended up in the same place it had been in both
Ventura and Thomas: a situation in which the BIA had not yet had the
chance to exercise power delegated to it from Congress. The Court cited
and discussed Ventura and Thomas,' 67 and said those cases "counsel a
similar result here."1 6 8 Therefore, the Court once again applied the ordi-
nary remand rule, saying: "Having concluded that the BIA has not yet
exercised its Chevron discretion to interpret the statute in question, 'the
proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency
for additional investigation or explanation."'"
69
The Court then articulated both formalist and functionalist justifica-
tions for remanding the unresolved interpretive issue to the BIA.1 70 The
Court relied primarily on the formalist view that remanding to the BIA
was appropriate because "ambiguities in statutes within an agency's ju-
risdiction to administer are delegations of authority to the agency to fill
the statutory gap in reasonable fashion."'7 1 In other words, the Court
emphasized that Congress delegated power to the agency to answer the
relevant interpretive question. Congress did not delegate that power to a
court. 172
The Court also briefly articulated a functionalist principle to support
its decision. 73 The Court noted that remanding the unresolved interpre-
tive issue to the BIA would allow the agency to "bring its expertise to
bear upon the matter . .. and . . . help a court later determine whether its
decision exceeds the leeway that the law provides." 74 In other words, the
Court suggested that the BIA has superior expertise in resolving interpre-
tive issues that fall within its sphere of authority. 175 In the end, after set-
ting out these justifications, the Court remanded the case "to the agency
for its initial determination of the statutory interpretation question and its
application to this case." 76
167. See id. at 523-24.
168. Id at 524.
169. Id at 523 (quoting Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 186 (2006) (per curiam)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
170. See id. at 523-24.
171. Id. at 523 (emphasis added) (quoting Nat'l Cable & Telecomm'ns Ass'n v. Brand X
Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
172. Justice Scalia echoed this sentiment in his concurrence in Negusie, saying that he agreed
with the Court's decision to remand because "[i]t is to agency officials, not to the Members of this
Court, that Congress has given discretion to choose among permissible interpretations of the stat-
ute." Id. at 528 (Scalia, J., concurring).
173. Id. at 517 (majority opinion).
174. Id. at 524 (quoting Gonzales, 547 U.S. at 186-87 (internal quotation mark omitted)).
175. The Court also made this point by saying: "When the BIA has not spoken on 'a matter
that statutes place primarily in agency hands,' our ordinary rule is to remand to 'giv[e] the BIA the
opportunity to address the matter in the first instance in light ofits own expertise."' Id. at 517 (altera-
tion in original) (emphasis added) (quoting INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16-17 (2002) (per curi-
am)).
176. Id at 524.
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In sum, the Negusie Court applied the ordinary remand rule to an
unresolved statutory interpretation question.177 One prominent scholar
has accurately characterized Negusie as holding: "[I]f a question of inter-
pretation remains with respect to an ambiguous provision of a statute an
agency administers, the ordinary course is for the court to remand the
question to the agency, which Congress has authorized to be the statute's
authoritative interpreter."l 7 8 This is clear from the Court's opinion.
That said, an important aspect of the Court's analysis has flown un-
der the radar. Once the Court decided that a dispositive statutory inter-
pretation question remained outstanding, the Court's decision to remand
turned on the fact that it had decided that the relevant statutory provision
was ambiguous and that Congress delegated power to the BIA to inter-
pret that provision.1 79 In other words, as in Ventura and Thomas, the Ne-
gusie Court reached its remand decision after conducting an analysis akin
to that set out in the framework for judicial review. To be sure, the Court
never expressly said it was applying the framework for judicial review in
order to answer the remand question. But the Court clearly decided to
remand the case to the BIA because the agency had "not yet exercised its
Chevron discretion to interpret the statute in question", 18 _discretion that
the Court determined the agency did, indeed, possess.
In short, when Negusie is read in conjunction with Ventura and
Thomas, the Court's lesson for unresolved statutory interpretation issues
becomes clear: If a case turns on the meaning of a statutory provision the
BIA either has not yet interpreted or has interpreted erroneously, the re-
viewing court should use the framework for judicial review to decide
whether to answer the interpretive question in the first instance or re-
mand the issue to the agency.
III. USING THE FRAMEWORK TO FURTHER
DEFINE THE BOUNDARIES OF THE REMAND RULE
The preceding Part discovered that the framework for judicial re-
view of agency statutory interpretations plays an important secondary
role in immigration law. Taken together, the Supreme Court cases that
define the contours of the ordinary remand rule indicate that when a re-
viewing court faces an unsettled statutory interpretation question, the
court should use the framework to decide whether to resolve the interpre-
tive issue in the first instance or remand the question to the BIA.
Negusie illustrates when a reviewing court's analysis under the
framework should ordinarily lead to a remand. Recall that the Court de-
177. See id. at 523-24; see also Walker, supra note 70, at 1578 (recognizing that the Negusie
Court applied "the ordinary remand rule to questions of statutory interpretation").
178. Walker, supra note 70, at 1579 (emphasis added).
179. See supra notes 155-169 and accompanying text.
180. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 523.
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termined that an interpretive issue remained outstanding in the case. 81
The Court had also ascertained that the relevant statutory provision was
ambiguous and that Congress had delegated power to the BIA to inter-
pret that provision.182 Thus, the Court located what Professor Strauss
calls "Chevron space."l83 This, of course, is "the area within which an
administrative agency has been statutorily empowered to act in a manner
that creates legal obligations or constraints-that is, its delegated or allo-
cated authority."l 84 Since the BIA had not yet acted within its "Chevron
space," the Court decided that it was appropriate to remand the case to
the agency. ss As the Court put it: "Having concluded that the BIA has
not yet exercised its Chevron discretion to interpret the statute in ques-
tion, 'the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the
agency for additional investigation or explanation.'" 86
And why is it ordinarily proper for a reviewing court to remand an
unresolved interpretive issue to an agency with Chevron discretion? Ne-
gusie indicates that it is for the same formalist and functionalist reasons
that a reviewing court defers to an agency when the agency does exercise
its Chevron discretion. The formalist reason is that Congress delegated
lawmaking power to the agency to answer the interpretive question left
unresolved by the statute.188 The functionalist reason is that an agency
generally has greater experience and expertise in resolving interpretive
issues that fall within its sphere of authority. 89
Negusie therefore identifies one situation in which a reviewing court
should ordinarily remand an unsettled interpretive issue to the BIA:
when, pursuant to the framework for judicial review, the court deter-
mines that the relevant statutory provision is ambiguous and Congress
delegated power to the BIA to interpret that provision. In other words,
remand is appropriate when the agency possesses Chevron discretion.1 90
But suppose that, in considering whether to remand an outstanding statu-
tory interpretation question, a reviewing court determines that the BIA
does not possess Chevron discretion-either because (1) the relevant
statutory provision is unambiguous, or (2) the relevant statutory provi-
sion is ambiguous, but Congress did not delegate power to the BIA to
181. See supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text
182. See supra notes 155-64 and accompanying text.
183. Strauss, supra note 1, at 1145 (internal quotation marks omitted).
184. Id.
185. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 523-24.
186. Id. at 523 (quoting Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 186 (2006) (per curiam)) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Glen, supra note 93, at 3 ("[D]ecisions entrusted to the agency
must be made by the agency in the first instance prior to resolution by the courts of appeals. Accord-
ingly, if a decision must turn on a determination that the agency for some reason has not yet made,
the courts of appeals should generally remand the matter for determination by the agency in the first
instance rather than resolving that issue de novo during the appellate process.").
I87. See supra notes 170-76 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
I89. See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
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interpret that provision. Should the reviewing court remand the case to
the BIA in either of these situations? Unfortunately, Negusie does not
answer this question. This is because, as one prominent scholar points
out, Negusie only established that a reviewing court should remand un-
settled "questions of . .. law when such questions fall within the space
delegated to an agency."l91 NeguSie did not address whether a remand is
appropriate outside this context.
This Part, therefore, picks up where Negusie left off and considers
whether remand is appropriate in the two situations the Court has not yet
confronted. Having established that the framework for judicial review
plays a key role in the remand discussion, this Part now uses that frame-
work to identify those instances in which a reviewing court should re-
mand an unresolved interpretive issue to the BIA and those in which the
court should answer the question without remanding. Ultimately, the
goal of this exercise is to define the proper relationship between courts
and the BIA when it comes to resolving outstanding statutory interpreta-
tion questions.
A. The First Situation
1. The Problem: The Relevant Statutory Provision is Unambiguous
Suppose that a court is reviewing a decision from the BIA and
quickly discovers that the case turns on the meaning of a statutory provi-
sion the agency either has not yet interpreted or has interpreted errone-
ously. Assume further that the court draws on the framework for judicial
review in order to decide whether to answer the interpretive question in
the first instance or remand the issue to the BIA. The court "employ[s]
traditional tools of statutory construction,"l 92 including a consideration of
the statute's textl 93 and legislative history, 194 and, unlike Negusie, deter-
mines at Chevron step one that the relevant statutory provision is clear.
Should the court answer the interpretive question on its own or remand
the matter to the BIA for a decision in the first instance?
2. The Solution: The Reviewing Court Should Resolve the Interpre-
tive Issue
In this situation, the reviewing court should resolve the interpretive
issue on its own. This is because neither formalist nor functionalist justi-
fications warrant remanding the matter to the agency. With respect to
formalism, the Chevron Court made it clear that, "[i]f a court, employing
traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an
intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and
191. Walker, supra note 70, at 1579 (emphasis added).
192. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984).
193. See id. at 859-62.
194. See id at 862-64.
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must be given effect."l 95 In other words, the court will have determined
that "Congress itself is the source of clear law."l 96 Since this obviously
means that Congress did not delegate lawmaking power to the agency to
interpret the relevant statutory provision,1 97 there would be no formalist
reason to remand the statutory interpretation question to the agency.
There would also be no functionalist reason to remand the interpre-
tive issue to the BIA. At this point, the reviewing court has already an-
swered the pertinent statutory interpretation question. Therefore, the
court should go ahead and "give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress."'99 Remanding the matter to the agency at this point
would serve no purpose other than to see if the agency agrees with the
court that the statute is unambiguous. Ultimately, however, it is up to the
court to decide whether Congress has clearly defined the law. 20 0 If the
court has already made that determination, then there is no need for the
court to waste time and resources by remanding the matter to the agency.
After all, the conclusion would be forgone.
Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion in Negusie is consistent with
the view that a reviewing court need not remand an otherwise outstand-
ing interpretive issue to an agency if the court decides the relevant statu-
tory provision is clear. 20' Recall that, in Negusie, the majority held that
the BIA had erroneously deemed its interpretation of the INA's persecu-
tor bar to be controlled by Supreme Court precedent and thus, the inter-
pretive issue remained unsettled.20 2 Although the majority decided to
remand the matter to the agency for a decision in the first instance, Jus-
tice Thomas disagreed, writing:
The majority . . . holds that the INA is ambiguous as to "whether co-
ercion or duress is relevant in determining if an alien assisted or oth-
erwise participated in persecution" and that the agency, therefore,
should interpret the statute in the first instance to determine whether
it reasonably can be read to include a voluntariness requirement. I
195. Id. at 843 n.9 (emphasis added); see also Healy, supra note 1, at 15 ("When a court de-
termines that Congress has defined the law because of the law's clarity, that law governs." (footnote
omitted)).
196. Healy, supra note 1, at 33.
197. Id. at 40 ("If ... the statute is determined to be unambiguous at step 1, the agency has no
power to define the law.").
198. See also Walker, supra note 70, at 1570-71 ("[I]f the agency's interpretation fails at the
first step, there would be no reason to remand because the statutory provision at issue is unambigu-
ous and the agency would have no discretion to exercise . . . ."); id. at 1574 n. 100 ("[R]emand is not
necessary if the court concludes that ... the statutory provision is unambiguous and thus the agency
has no discretion to exercise (Chevron step one).").
199. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
200. See id at 843 n.9 ("The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construc-
tion . . . ."); see also Healy, supra note 1, at 33 ("[T]he judiciary is the governmental institution that
plays the key role in discerning the content of the law that Congress has established."); id. at 33-34
("The judiciary determines the content of the law defined by Congress .... ).
201. See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 538-54 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
202. See id. at 518-20 (majority opinion).
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disagree .... Because the INA unambiguously precludes any inquiry
into whether the persecutor acted voluntarily, i.e., free from coercion
or duress, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 203
Justice Thomas was not particularly concerned about the BIA's reliance
on Supreme Court precedent to interpret the relevant statutory provi-
204Jutcwrtwa
sion. Indeed, Justice Thomas wrote that it was "largely irrelevant
whether the BIA properly relied on [Court precedent] in interpreting the
statute."205 This is because, as Justice Thomas succinctly and persuasive-
ly put it: "There is no reason to remand the question to the agency when
only one construction of the statute is permissible . . . ."206
In sum, if a reviewing court faces an unsettled statutory interpreta-
tion question, and it determines that the relevant statutory provision is
clear, then the court should resolve the interpretive issue in the first in-
stance. After all, neither formalist nor functionalist rationales justify re-
manding the matter to the BIA in this situation.
B. The Second Situation
1. The Problem: The Relevant Statutory Provision is Ambiguous,
But Congress Did Not Delegate Lawmaking Power to the Agen-
cy
Suppose, once again, that a reviewing court faces an outstanding
statutory interpretation question. Assume further that the court draws on
the framework for judicial review in order to decide whether to answer
the interpretive question in the first instance or remand the issue to the
BIA. But, this time, the court determines that the relevant statutory pro-
vision is ambiguous and that Congress did not delegate power to the BIA
to interpret that provision. Professor Guendelsberger has recognized that
an example of such an issue-that is, one falling "outside the [BIA's]
delegated domain"-would include "the meaning of provisions in state
or federal criminal statutes." 207 This is because, although the BIA is
charged with interpreting ambiguous provisions of immigration law ,208
"[t]he courts are primarily responsible for statutory interpretation of the
203. Id. at 539 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also id at
550-51 ("The question before the Court . . . is whether Congress has provided an unambiguous
answer in the plain language that is chose to use. Here, . . . the traditional tools of statutory interpre-
tation show with 'utmost clarity' that the statute applies regardless of the voluntariness of the alien
who participates or assists in persecution." (citation omitted) (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289,
329 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
204. See id. at 551 n.4.
205. Id. (citation omitted).
206. Id.
207. Guendelsberger, supra note 68, at 644. Professor Guendelsberger is now a prominent
member of the BIA. See Board of Immigration Appeals Biographical Information, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/fs/biabios.htm#JohnW.Guendelsberger (last updated Mar.
2015).
208. See supra note 165.
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criminal grounds of removal, and other questions of law over which the
Board does not exercise primary interpretive responsibility."209 Using
this example, if a case turns on such an unresolved interpretive issue, it is
not immediately clear whether the reviewing court should answer the
interpretive question on its own or remand the case to the BIA so it can
address the issue in the first instance.
On the one hand, Mead established that when an agency lacks law-
making authority, the reviewing court must independently interpret the
statutory provision.210 In other words, "the court itself must determine a
substantive meaning of the ambiguous statute." 211 Thus, it may seem
unnecessary for the court to remand the case to the BIA.
On the other hand, "[i]n reaching its judgment about the substance
of the law enacted by Congress, the court may be aided by the agency's
experience and expertise to the extent that the court finds them to be
,,212
helpful and persuasive. As one scholar has said: "This is the core of
Skidmore deference: the court is interpreting the statute, with the agency
offering assistance in understanding what the statute provides." 213 Simi-
larly, another scholar has recognized that "'Skidmore weight' addresses
the possibility that an agency's view on a given statutory question may in
itself warrant respect by judges who themselves have ultimate interpre-
209. Guendelsberger, supra note 68, at 649 (emphasis added). Several courts have echoed this
point. See, e.g., Ng v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 436 F.3d 392, 395 (3d Cir. 2006) ("This case turns on a
question of pure statutory interpretation. Specifically, we must determine the meaning and applica-
tion of the term 'crime of violence,' as ... defined at 18 U.S.C. § 16 .... 'The BIA's interpretation
of 18 U.S.C. § 16 is not entitled to deference by this Court" because, among other things, it is "a
federal [criminal] provision outside the INA . . , ." (quoting Singh v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 533, 538
(3d Cir. 2006))); Patel v. Ashcroft, 401 F.3d 400, 407 (6th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that Congress did
not charge the BIA with "interpreting state statutes and federal statutes unrelated to immigration");
Smalley v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 332, 336 (5th Cir. 2003) (stating that "the BIA's administrative role"
is to "interpret[] ... federal immigration laws, not state and federal criminal statutes"); Flores v.
Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that Congress did "not delegate any power
to the immigration bureaucracy . .. or to the Board of Immigration Appeals" to interpret the meaning
of the phrase "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16, a federal criminal statute); Garcia-Lopez v.
Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 840, 843 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that the BIA does not administer state criminal
statutes), overruled by Ceron v. Holder, 747 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2014); Omagah v. Ashcroft, 288 F.3d
254, 258 (5th Cir. 2002) ("Determining a particular federal or state crime's elements lies beyond the
scope of the BIA's delegated power . . . ."); Francis v. Reno, 269 F.3d 162, 168 (3d Cir. 2001)
("Chevron instructs that we accord deference only to the BIA's 'construction of the statute which it
administers.' The BIA is not charged with administering 18 U.S.C. § 16, and that statute is not
transformed into an immigration law merely because it is incorporated into the INA by §
I l01(a)(43)(F). We therefore conclude that the BIA's interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 16 is not entitled
to deference under Chevron." (citation omitted) (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984))); Ming Lam Sui v. INS, 250 F.3d 105, 112-13 (2d Cir.
2001) (stating that the BIA "is not charged with the administration of [state or federal criminal]
laws"); Michel v. INS, 206 F.3d 253, 262 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[T]he agency is not charged with the
administration of [state or federal criminal] laws.").
210. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
211. Healy, supra note 1, at 46.
212. Id. at 46-47.
213. Id. at 47 n.285.
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tive authority." 2 14 In short, while "[t]he courts are primarily responsible
for statutory interpretation of the criminal grounds of removal, and other
questions of law over which the Board does not exercise primary inter-
pretive responsibility," those courts may apply "a Skidmore measure of
deference to the Board's reasoning." 215 Therefore, the court might con-
sider remanding the case so the BIA could help the court determine the
meaning of the relevant statutory provision.
Professor Guendelsberger first highlighted this problem ten years
ago, shortly after Ventura, when he said:
When the issue not yet addressed by the agency is a purely
legal issue, there may be situations in which a court may re-
solve the question without the need for remand. . . . The re-
mand requirement might . .. be relaxed when the court faces a
question of statutory interpretation of an issue determined to be
outside the agency's domain ... . Whether the Mead reference
to Skidmore deference in lieu of Chevron deference should re-
quire a remand to the agency in such a situation remains un-
clear.216
While the Court's remand jurisprudence has developed over the last dec-
ade, the Court still has not decided the issue raised by Professor Guen-
delsberger. So, should a reviewing court remand a matter to the BIA
when doing so will only allow the agency to provide the court with an
interpretation worthy of Skidmore deference?
The limited scholarship on point suggests that the answer is no. Pro-
fessor Guendelsberger, for example, argued that "[f]or issues outside the
[BIA's] delegated domain, such as the meaning of provisions in state or
federal criminal statutes, the court should be permitted to consider the
agency analysis for its persuasive effect under Mead and Skidmore and
supplement otherwise insufficient agency analysis without the need for
remand." 2 17 It appears that Professor Guendelsberger was persuaded by
214. Strauss, supra note I at 1145; see id. at 1143 ("'Skidmore weight' addresses the possibil-
ity that an agency's view on a given statutory question may in itself warrant the respect of judges
who are themselves unmistakably responsible for deciding the question of statutory meaning.").
215. Guendelsberger, supra note 68, at 649.
216. Id. at 636 (emphasis added). Not long after Professor Guendelsberger wrote these words,
the Ninth Circuit said it was
reluctant to rule on the merits of an issue that the BIA has not itself addressed. In INS v.
Ventura, the Supreme Court instructed that "[g]enerally speaking, a court of appeals
should remand a case to an agency for decision of a matter that statutes place primarily in
agency hands."
Ray v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 582, 591 (9th Cir. 2006) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quot-
ing INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16-17 (2002) (per curiam)). That said, the Ninth Circuit went on to
"note that it may be appropriate for us to address the merits of purely legal claims . . . as to which we
would not 'intrude upon [a] domain which Congress has exclusively entrusted to an administrative
agency."' Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Ventura, 537 U.S. at 16) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
217. Guendelsberger, supra note 68, at 644 (emphasis added).
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the formalist notion that, if Congress did not delegate lawmaking power
to the BIA, and thus the relevant interpretive issue falls outside the agen-
cy's "delegated domain," then the reviewing court has the authority to
resolve the issue and should do so in the first instance.218
A few other scholars have made passing comments that echo this
formalist view. One scholar, for example, has suggested that if, on re-
mand, the BIA will be addressing a matter "outside its own institutional
purview," then there may be "no compelling justifications for remand
and against judicial resolution of the issue in the first instance." 2 19 Like-
wise, another scholar has said that "if the [reviewing] court concludes
that the agency lacks authority to interpret the statute . . . then only Skid-
more persuasive deference would apply and arguably there would be no
need to remand."220 In short, the limited scholarship on point suggests
that a reviewing court need not remand an unsettled statutory interpreta-
tion question to an agency when the issue falls outside the agency's
sphere of authority. Rather, these authorities suggest that the court can
and should resolve the interpretive matter on its own.
2. The Solution: The Reviewing Court Should Remand the Inter-
pretive Issue
Despite the scholarship to the contrary, a reviewing court should
generally remand an unsettled interpretive question to the BIA if the
agency's interpretation would be entitled to Skidmore deference on re-
view. This is because, although formalist principles do not support a re-
mand in this context, multiple functionalist rationales do warrant a re-
mand.
As an initial matter, it is worth recognizing that the resolution of an
interpretive issue may be important even if the issue falls outside the
BIA's "delegated domain." 22 1 For example, the reviewing court's inter-
pretation of a criminal statute may be the key to determining whether a
218. Indeed, in considering whether a reviewing court should remand an unresolved interpre-
tive issue to an agency, Professor Guendelsberger focused on whether the issue fell "within the
domain of agency authority delegated by Congress." Id. With that in mind, Professor Guendels-
berger argued that, "[w]hen the issue involves statutory interpretation within the domain of agency
authority delegated by Congress, and the Board's reasoning is insufficient for meaningful review,
the court should remand for a reasoned agency decision on the legal point in question." Id. In other
words, Professor Guendelsberger argued that "the courts should permit the [BIA] to address unre-
solved issues involving interpretation of the immigration law before examining whether the Board's
interpretation is within the leeway permitted by Chevron and Mead." Id. at 649. Interestingly, Pro-
fessor Guendelsberger made these arguments almost five years before the Supreme Court's similar
holding in Negusie. See supra notes 142-80 and accompanying text (discussing Negusie).
219. Glen, supra note 93, at 46.
220. Walker, supra note 70, at 1571; see also id. at 1574 n.100 ("[R]emand is not necessary if
the court concludes that Congress did not delegate any Chevron discretion to the agency . . . ."); id
at 1579 ("[T]he ordinary remand rule applies broadly, and the only exceptions should be when there
are minor errors as to subsidiary issues that do not affect the agency's ultimate decision, or when the
agency lacks authority to decide the issue." (emphasis added)).
221. See Guendelsberger, supra note 68, at 644.
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noncitizen should be removed from the United States. If the court makes
a mistake in interpreting the statute, the noncitizen could be wrongfully
removed or, alternatively, unjustly allowed to remain in the country.
Thus, the court should exercise great care in resolving such a significant
interpretive matter. With this in mind, a reviewing court should generally
remand an unsettled interpretive question to the BIA if the agency's in-
terpretation would be entitled to Skidmore deference on review.
To be sure, formalist principles do not justify a remand in this situa-
tion. Clearly, if Congress did not delegate power to the BIA to answer
the relevant interpretive question, then the reviewing court would have
the legal authority to resolve the issue on its own. After all, Mead estab-
lished that when an agency does not possess lawmaking power, the re-
viewing court is ultimately responsible for independently interpreting the
222pertinent statute. Since, at the end of the day, the reviewing court will
have "to make its own independent judgment about the substance of the
congressional enactment," 22 3 formalist justifications do not point in the
direction of a remand.
Nevertheless, two functionalist rationales warrant a remand in this
situation. The first functionalist rationale is that remanding the unsettled
interpretive question to the BIA will allow the agency to bring its experi-
ence to bear to help the reviewing court determine the substantive mean-
ing of the relevant statute.224 Thus, if an immigration case turns on the
meaning of an ambiguous provision of a criminal statute, and the review-
ing court remands the interpretive issue to the BIA, then the agency can
use its considerable experience construing criminal statutes to offer an
interpretation that the court may find persuasive.
There is no doubt that the BIA has such experience. Although the
agency does not receive Chevron deference when it construes criminal
laws, it "routinely interprets criminal statutes because there are myriad
grounds for removal that are based upon a criminal conviction." 225 In-
deed, as one prominent scholar has recognized, "the body of law that
concerns the impact of criminal activity on noncitizens is now vast."226
Thus, the BIA must regularly interpret criminal statutes in order to de-
termine whether a noncitizen should be removed from the United States
222. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
223. Healy, supra note 1, at 47; see also id at 48 (acknowledging that when Congress does not
delegate authority to an agency to resolve an interpretive issue, "the only law is the law that Con-
gress itself defined in the statute; the court is responsible for determining the content of that law");
id at 49 (recognizing that when an agency does not possess delegated power, "the court itself ...
[must] discern the substantive meaning of the ambiguous statute").
224. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
225. Mary Holper, Specific Intent and the Purposeful Narrowing of Victim Protection Under
the Convention Against Torture, 88 OR. L. REV. 777, 825 (2009).
226. Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of
Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 483 (2007).
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227
or face some other adverse immigration consequence2. While Congress
may not have delegated power to the BIA to interpret ambiguous provi-
228
sions of criminal statutes, there is no doubt that the agency interprets
such provisions on a regular basis.
Still, multiple courts have stressed that the BIA has no "special" or
"particular" expertise in interpreting criminal statutes. For example, one
court has said the BIA's interpretation of the phrase "crime of violence"
in 18 U.S.C. § 16 is not entitled to deference because, "as a federal
[criminal] provision outside the INA, it lies beyond the BIA's special
area of expertise." 22 9 Similarly, another court has said the "BIA has no
particular expertise in construing federal and state criminal statutes,"
and, therefore, the agency's interpretation of such statutes is not afforded
deference.230
It is true that the BIA has no special or particular expertise in con-
struing ambiguous provisions of criminal statutes. But this criticism ap-
pears to relate to formalism and the fact that these interpretive issues fall
outside the BIA's congressionally "delegated domain," which is immi-
gration law. 23 ' And that only explains why the BIA should not receive
Chevron deference when it interprets an ambiguous provision of a crimi-
nal statute. It says nothing about the BIA's ability to persuade a court,
pursuant to Skidmore, as to the meaning of a statutory provision, given
the agency's experience.
Judge Easterbrook's opinion in Flores v. Ashcroft232 helps make the
point. In Flores, the Seventh Circuit refused to grant Chevron deference
to the BIA's interpretation of "crime of violence" in 18 U.S.C. § 16.233
Citing Mead, Judge Easterbrook explained:
Chevron deference depends on delegation, and § 16(a) does
not delegate any power to the .. . Board of Immigration Ap-
peals. Section 16 is a criminal statute, and just as courts do not
defer to the Attorney General or United States Attorney when
§ 16 must be interpreted in a criminal prosecution, so there is
no reason for deference when the same statute must be con-
strued in a removal proceeding. Any delegation of interpretive
227. See also id. at 482-83 (discussing the many ways in which "a criminal conviction can
damage one's immigration status").
228. See supra note 209.
229. Ng v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 436 F.3d 392, 395 (3d Cir. 2006) (emphasis added) (quoting
Singh v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 533, 538 (3d Cir. 2006)).
230. Rodriguez v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 2006) (emphasis added).
231. See Guendelsberger, supra note 68, at 644.
232. 350 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2003).
233. See id at 671 ("[T]he agency's interpretation ... has no binding effect along Chevron's
lines.").
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authority runs to the Judicial Branch rather than the Executive
Branch.2 34
That said, Judge Easterbrook expressly recognized that "the agency's
interpretation . . . may have persuasive force," and he then said, "we
must give it careful consideration."235
It is worth giving "careful consideration" to the BIA's interpretation
of an ambiguous provision of a criminal statute because the BIA has ex-
perience interpreting such provisions. Thus, if an immigration case turns
on such an unresolved interpretive issue, the reviewing court should re-
mand that issue to the BIA so that it can bring its experience to bear and
help the court make a more informed judgment about the meaning of the
statute.
A second functionalist rationale also justifies a remand in the Skid-
more situation. That rationale is that allowing the BIA to answer the stat-
utory interpretation question in the first instance will promote uniformity
across the circuits. In an immigration removal case, for example, if the
BIA construes an ambiguous provision of a criminal statute in the first
instance, then all of the circuits will have the benefit of the agency's
views. Therefore, each circuit court can consider the agency's interpreta-
tion and decide whether it is persuasive. Simply stated, the agency's in-
terpretation "can contribute to an efficient, predictable, and nationally
uniform understanding of the law." 236
It is true that, in the end, some circuits may not find the BIA's in-
terpretation persuasive. Nevertheless, the agency's interpretation will
increase the likelihood that the circuits will agree on the meaning of the
relevant statutory provision. As one scholar aptly put it, "national uni-
formity will still be promoted, though not guaranteed, by the courts
,,237
granting Skidmore deference to agency interpretations. At the very
least, the BIA's resolution of the interpretive issue in the first instance
will foster a uniformity of consideration in which each circuit can reflect
on the agency's initial interpretation and determine whether it is persua-
sive. In short, remanding an unsettled interpretive issue to the BIA for a
decision worthy of Skidmore deference will not guarantee national uni-
formity; however, remanding in this situation at least "allows for en-
234. Id. (citation omitted) (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001)).
235. Id. (emphases added). Ultimately, Judge Easterbrook decided that the agency's interpreta-
tion was "not persuasive." See id.
236. Strauss, supra note 1, at 1146.
237. Herz, supra note 51, at 197 n.57. Other scholars have also recognized that granting Skid-
more deference to an agency's statutory interpretation promotes national uniformity. See, e.g.,
Hickman & Krueger, supra note 3, at 1256 (mentioning, in the context of Skidmore, that "courts can
promote uniformity of the law and thereby promote the public good by harmonizing judicial inter-
pretations with administrative interpretations").
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hanced consistency in the application of statutes." 23 8 This is obviously a
worthy functionalist goal.239
In conclusion, a reviewing court should generally remand an unset-
tled statutory interpretation question to the BIA if the agency's interpre-
tation would be entitled to Skidmore deference on review. To be sure,
formalist principles do not justify remanding in this context. However,
two functionalist rationales do warrant a remand. First, remanding the
outstanding interpretive issue to the BIA will allow the agency to bring
its experience to bear to help the court determine the substantive mean-
ing of the pertinent statutory provision. Second, remanding the unre-
solved matter will increase the chances that the circuits will agree on the
meaning of the relevant provision.
IV. AN OUTLINE OF THE PROPER BALANCE OF POWER
BETWEEN COURTS AND THE BIA
Taken together, the Supreme Court's decisions in Ventura, Thomas,
and Negusie teach an important lesson: If a case turns on the meaning of
a statutory provision the BIA either has not yet interpreted or has inter-
preted erroneously, the reviewing court should use the framework for
judicial review to decide whether to answer the interpretive question in
the first instance or remand the issue to the agency. 240 With this in mind,
the previous Part used the framework to identify the circumstances under
which reviewing courts should and should not remand unsettled interpre-
tive issues to the BIA.241 This exercise creates an outline of the proper
balance of power between courts and the BIA when it comes to resolving
outstanding statutory interpretation questions.
At one end of the spectrum, a reviewing court may draw on the
framework for judicial review and decide that the relevant statutory pro-
vision is clear. In this situation, the court should answer the interpretive
question in the first instance. This is because neither formalist nor func-
tionalist justifications warrant remanding the matter to the BIA. 24 2
At the other end of the spectrum, a reviewing court may draw on the
framework for judicial review and decide that the relevant statutory pro-
238. Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore Within the Architecture of
Chevron, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1105, 1118 (2001) (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
134, 139-40 (1944)).
239. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of
Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 38 (1994) ("Both the Constitution's framers and
the Supreme Court have stressed that the articulation of nationally uniform interpretations of federal
law is an important objective of the federal adjudicatory process. Such uniform interpretation serves
several laudable goals of a coherent and legitimate judicial system." (footnotes omitted)). For a
discussion of the contrasting views on "[t]he importance of uniformity in [the interpretation of]
federal law," see Martha Dragich, Unformity, Inferiority, and the Law of the Circuit Doctrine, 56
Loy. L. REV. 535, 540-44 (2010).
240. See supra Part II.
241. See supra Part 111.
242. See supra Part IlIl.A.
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vision is ambiguous and that Congress delegated power to the BIA to
interpret that provision. In this situation, the BIA possesses Chevron dis-
cretion. Pursuant to the ordinary remand rule, a reviewing court should
generally remand an outstanding statutory interpretation question to an
agency with Chevron discretion. This is because both formalist and func-
tionalist justifications point in the direction of a remand.243
Perhaps the most difficult situation is when a reviewing court draws
on the framework for judicial review and decides that the relevant statu-
tory provision is ambiguous, but that Congress did not delegate power to
the BIA to interpret that provision. In this situation, an initial agency
interpretation would be entitled to Skidmore deference on review, not
Chevron deference. Under this circumstance, the reviewing court should
generally remand the interpretive issue to the BIA. This is because, alt-
hough formalist principles do not justify remanding in this context, mul-
tiple functionalist rationales do warrant a remand.24
In the end, the framework for judicial review is crucial to under-
standing when a reviewing court should answer an outstanding interpre-
tive question in the first instance and when the court should remand the
issue to the BIA. That said, if a reviewing court faces an unsettled inter-
pretive issue, and it determines that the relevant statutory provision is
ambiguous, the court may choose not to proceed any further with the
framework for judicial review. That is because remand will be the proper
course of action whether or not Congress delegated lawmaking power to
the BIA. After all, functionalist principles alone justify a remand even if
the BIA's interpretation will only be entitled to Skidmore deference on
review.
On that point, one final note is in order. If functionalist justifications
alone warrant a remand in the Skidmore context, then the formalist justi-
fications supporting a remand in the Chevron context are overstated. In
other words, although the Supreme Court has supported the ordinary
remand rule with both formalist and functionalist rationales, 245 function-
alist principles by themselves can support the rule. After all, as the fore-
going analysis has demonstrated, a remand is appropriate even when
Congress did not delegate lawmaking power to the BIA and, thus, for-
malist justifications do not point in the direction of a remand.
CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that courts should use the framework for judicial
review primarily to decide how much deference to give to an agency's
statutory interpretation. This Article has demonstrated, however, that the
framework also plays an important secondary role in immigration law.
243. See supra notes 181-90 and accompanying text (discussing Negusie).
244. See supra Part III.B.
245. See supra notes 167-76 accompanying text (discussing Negusie).
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Indeed, if an immigration case turns on the meaning of a statutory provi-
sion the BIA either has not yet interpreted or has interpreted erroneously,
the reviewing court should draw on the framework for judicial review-
not to determine how much deference to give to the BIA, but rather to
decide whether to answer the interpretive question in the first instance or
remand the issue to the agency.
After recognizing that the framework for judicial review plays a
valuable role in the remand context, this Article used the framework to
identify those instances in which a reviewing court should remand an
unresolved interpretive issue to the BIA and those in which the court
should answer the question without remanding. Ultimately, the Article
argued that, when a reviewing court faces an unsettled interpretive issue,
and it decides, pursuant to the framework for judicial review, that the
relevant statutory provision is ambiguous, the court should remand the
matter to the BIA. This is true whether or not Congress delegated law-
making power to the BIA. Thus, a remand is proper if the BIA's interpre-
tation will be entitled to either Chevron or Skidmore deference on re-
view. In the end, this Article's analysis helps define the modem relation-
ship between courts and the BIA when it comes to resolving outstanding
statutory interpretation questions.
